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Loss-of-Control and General 
Aviation Accident Statistics
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NTSB Mission
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an 
independent Federal agency created by the U.S. Congress to 
investigate every civil aviation accident in the United States 
and significant accidents in the other modes of transportation, 
namely – marine, highway, railroad and pipeline.
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What We Do
• Investigate the accident.
• Determine the probable 
cause of the accident.
• Propose corrective action to 
reduce the likelihood of a 
recurrence of the accident -
through formal 
“recommendations”.
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Investigative Process for Major Investigations
• Decision to launch a “Go-Team”
• IIC and other staff designated
• Arrival On-Scene
• Organizational Meeting
• Briefings and on-scene activities (i.e. fact 
gathering) 
• Post on-scene fact gathering
• Analysis
• Report preparation – findings, PC, recommendation 
development
• Board Approval
• Advocacy
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“Sully” Depiction of NTSB?
• Facts regarding accident accurately 
portrayed
• Depiction of investigation process not 
accurate
• Movie needed a villain – but not the birds
• NTSB’s objective is to determine cause, not blame
• Investigations rely heavily upon cooperation by all 
of the “parties,” hence NTSB is not confrontational
• Movie’s negative portrayal of investigation process 
may chill cooperation
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NTSB Investigative Hearing
• Three-day public hearing June 9-11, 2009
• Board of Inquiry Chaired by Member Robert 
Sumwalt
• Investigative Hearing
• Fact-finding only
• No conclusions
• No assignment of fault or blame
• No enforcement responsibilities
• Video of Hearing available on YouTube
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NTSB’s Multi-Modal Mandate
• Maintain 
congressionally 
mandated 
independence
• Conduct objective 
accident investigations 
and safety studies
• Perform fair & objective 
airman/mariner 
certification appeals 
• Advocate safety – NTSB 
Most Wanted List, 
recommendations 
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NTSB 2017/2018 Most Wanted List
• Eliminate Distractions
• End Alcohol and Other Drug 
Impairment in Transportation
• Ensure the Safe Shipment of 
Hazardous Materials
• Expand Recorder Use to Enhance 
Safety
• Improve Rail Transit Safety Oversight
• Increase Implementation of Collision 
Avoidance Technologies
• Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in 
General Aviation
• Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents
• Require Medical Fitness
• Strengthen Occupant Protection
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Backed by recommendations!
2017/2018 MWL – Prevent Loss of 
Control in GA Flight
9
Loss of Control
10
Beech A36 / Huggins, MO 
/ June 12, 2015
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2017/2018 MWL – Prevent Loss of 
Control in GA Flight
• On average, more than 40% fatal 
GA accidents were LOC during 
2004 – 2016
• Most deadly flight phases
• Approach to landing
• Maneuvering
• Climb
12
All GA Accidents
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*The 2011 GA Survey is currently not available. FAA is actively engaged in re-calibration efforts 
and expect to have validated 2011 data published at a later date.
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*The 2011 GA Survey is currently not available. FAA is actively engaged in re-calibration efforts and expect 
to have validated 2011 data published at a later date.
Corporate Flying, 2008-2017
16
8%
8%
8%
8%
17%
50%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Other
Runway Excursion
Undershoot/Overshoot
Unintended Flight Into IMC
Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Loss of Control In-Flight
Fatal Accidents by Defining Event
Excludes cases without event data
Business Flying, 2008-2017
17
1%
1%
3%
3%
3%
3%
4%
9%
10%
21%
40%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Abrupt Maneuver
Low Altitude Operation
Other
Turbulence Encounter
Unknown
Windshear/Thunderstorm
System/Component Failure - Non-power
Fuel Related
System/Component Failure - Powerplant
Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Loss of Control In-Flight
Fatal Accidents by Defining Event
Excludes cases without event data
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
2%
2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
3%
5%
6%
7%
9%
51%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Security Related
Turbulence Encounter
Abnormal Runway Contact
Loss of Control on Ground
Simulated/training event
Unintended Flight Into IMC
Ground Handling
Collision on Takeoff or Landing
Fuel Related
System/Component Failure - Non-power
Low Altitude Operation
Other
Abrupt Maneuver
Unknown
Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Midair
System/Component Failure - Powerplant
Loss of Control In-Flight
Fatal Accidents by Defining Event
Instructional Flying, 2008-2017
18 Excludes cases without event data
Personal Flying, 2008-2017
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GA LOC:  Where It Happens
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[Diagram from Weener slide 
presentation to GAMA on 9/20/16, 
slide 42]
[Consider repeating airport pie 
chart from previous slide]
Airport-Related GA LOC
Fatal GA Loss of Control Accidents 
2008-2017
VFR Downwind – 2%
VFR Base – 3%
Final – 7%
VFR/IFR 
Approach 
4%
Missed Approach/ 
Go Around – 6%
VFR Crosswind – 1%
Takeoff – 7%
Initial Climb – 17%
Worldwide Commercial Jets
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LOC:  23% of Fatal Accidents
• Identify future areas of study/risk
• Charter safety studies
• Provide guidance and direction
• Draw data from various areas
• Develop a prioritized Safety Plan 
• Develop metrics to measure 
effectiveness of safety solutions
• Data analyses
• Safety enhancement
• Mitigation development
• Strategic guidance 
• Management/Approval of Safety Plan
• Provide direction
• Membership Outreach
• Provides linkage to ASIAS
Steering Committee
Co-chairs – Mike O'Donnell (FAA/AVP)
Sean Elliott (EAA)
Government – FAA (AFS, AIR, ATO, AAM & ARP)
– NASA (Research), 
– NTSB (Observer)
Industry – GAMA, EAA, NBAA, NATA, 
SAFE, LAMA & Insurance
Safety Analysis Team
Co-chairs: Corey Stephens (FAA) 
Jens Hennig (GAMA)
Members:  FAA, AOPA,  EAA, GAMA, UAA, MFGs,
FAAST, NAFI, Insurance, Academia, SAFE
Working Groups
(To include SMEs from various general 
aviation segments, depending on study)
GAJSC
Who We Are…
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Loss-Of-Control Working Group
Safety Enhancements Identified
• AOA – New, Current, Retrofit
• Aeronautical Decision Making
• Stabilized Approach
• Single Pilot CRM
• Medication effects
• Weather Technologies
• Etc…  
28 Safety Enhancements
plus
8 more with second study
Lower Cost AOA Displays
• Stall occurs at a specific    
Angle-of-Attack 
• But not necessarily at the same 
airspeed
FAA policy 
changed on Non-
Required Safety 
Equipment
First of AOA 
indicators built to 
ASTM stds and 
installed as a minor 
mod
LOC Roundtable – What, When, Where
28
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Roundtable Agenda
Organizations At The Table
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Douglas Adams
Author
“Human beings, 
who are almost unique 
in having the ability to learn 
from the experience of others, 
are also remarkable 
for their apparent disinclination to do so.”
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Safety Management System
• Safety Policy
• Safety Risk Management
• Safety Assurance
• Safety Promotion
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Changes to Safety Culture
Reactive & Forensic
• Whack-a-mole 
management
• Crisis safety 
management
• Silos of knowledge
• Data is collected
Risk-based & Predictive
• Risk management
• Change management
• Data analysis and 
information sharing
• Data answers questions
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Changes to Safety Culture
Reactive & Forensic
• “Off with their heads”
• Safety organization 
responsible for safety
• Regulator is 
dictatorial and 
despised
• Safety expected by 
regulations
Risk-based & Predictive
• Just culture
• Everyone responsible for  
safety
• Regulator is collaborative 
and respected
• Safety enhanced via 
voluntary initiatives
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